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policy and politics

Toward Acceptance of
Uterus Transplants
by David Orentlicher

S

hould surgeons offer uterus transplants to women who want to become pregnant but do not have a
functioning uterus? The debate reminds
us that society often neglects the interests of the infertile.
Only a handful of uterus transplants
have been reported worldwide—including two this past September1—but
advances in technique may make the
transplants available more widely. Some
women are born without a functioning
uterus; others have hysterectomies for
cancer, postpartum hemorrhage, or other reasons. Many of these women want
to become mothers and carry their own
pregnancies.
However, the prospect of uterus
transplantation has elicited sharp criticism. According to ethics professor Rebecca Kukla, the surgery is not, “in any
traditional sense, therapeutic.”2
Why the controversy? After all, surgeons routinely transplant hearts, lungs,
livers, and kidneys. If a woman can
receive a new kidney, why not a new
uterus? Ethicists have raised a number
of objections, but on close examination,
none seems persuasive.
First, some scholars have distinguished life-extending organs from
life-enhancing body parts like faces and
hands. As long as transplant recipients
have their new organs, they must take
drugs to prevent their immune systems
from rejecting the transplanted organs.
The risks can be substantial. For example, the immunosuppressive drugs put
people at an increased risk of cancer. It
is one thing to assume serious health
risks for the possibility of a longer life,
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but are the risks of being a transplant
recipient justified by improvements in
the quality of life?3
There are a few important responses
to concerns about risk. For example,
over time, scientific advances have reduced the side effects from immunosuppression. The risks are not as serious
as they used to be. In addition, a transplanted uterus can be removed after
childbirth, avoiding the need for longterm immunosuppression that exists
with other kinds of transplants. Finally,
we generally allow patients to weigh the
benefits and risks of medical treatment
for themselves. Absent a disproportionate balance between risks and benefits,
it is not appropriate for society to usurp
patients’ health care decision-making
power. Hence, face and hand transplants are becoming more common
even though they do not prolong life.4
Critics of uterus transplants also
worry about health risks to others. Perhaps women can weigh for themselves
whether the benefits of uterus transplantation outweigh the risks. But they
are not the only people whose health
might be jeopardized. If a woman is
taking immunosuppressive drugs during her pregnancy, what risks are posed
to the child-to-be?5
Although no woman has yet given
birth after a uterus transplant, we still
have some important evidence regarding
the risks to fetuses from immunosuppressive drugs. Recipients of kidneys,
livers, and other organs take the same
immunosuppressive drugs as would recipients of a uterus transplant, and more
than fifteen thousand children have

been born to transplant recipients since
the 1950s.
Although the data are not definitive,
they are generally reassuring. While
children exposed to immunosuppressive
drugs during pregnancy are more likely
to have a premature birth and low birth
weight, they do not appear to be at elevated risk of physical malformations or
other serious side effects.6 Moreover, it
is generally difficult to argue that people
should not reproduce because of the
health risks to their offspring. Procreation is a right of fundamental importance and should be recognized for all
persons, even if they may pass a serious disease to their children. Thus, for
example, it is acceptable for women to
reproduce when they are infected with
HIV or carry the gene for a severe inherited disorder.
Of course, steps often can be taken
to minimize the risk that an infectious
or genetic disease will be transmitted
from women to child. Still, even when
risks remain, the right to reproduce is
preserved.
But, one might say, there is an important difference between women who
undergo uterus transplants and women
who have infectious or genetic diseases.
These latter women often cannot have
biologically related children without exposing them to the risk of their health
status. The woman wanting a uterus
transplant can have biologically related
children through in vitro fertilization
and gestational surrogacy. Thus, she
can have genetic ties to her children
and also protect them from exposure
to immunosuppressive drugs. As Kukla
observed, “tons of people have perfectly
normal lives without gestating a biological child.”7
Many women may be perfectly happy despite losing their ability to carry a
pregnancy, but that should not lead us
to dismiss the interests of those women
who very much want to become mothers through pregnancy. Indeed, there are
serious disadvantages if a woman lacking a functioning uterus tries to have
children without a transplant. If she becomes a parent through adoption, she
lacks biological ties to her children. In
addition, her offspring may suffer from
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significant developmental problems that
were not detected before the adoption.
Gestational surrogacy can ensure a
genetic relationship with children, but
it has serious drawbacks, too. In some
states and countries, it is prohibited by
law.8 In addition, the genetic mother
loses the ability to develop gestational
ties with her child. As illustrated by
the disputes between surrogates and intended mothers, gestational ties play a
significant role in forming motherhood.
For many women, parenting without
pregnancy will leave a significant void.
A gestational surrogate may suffer
from her participation, as well. She may
not anticipate the extent to which she
will develop maternal ties during pregnancy, nor how difficult it will be to
relinquish her parental role. Hence, she
may wish to maintain her relationship
with her child. Her desire for an ongoing relationship also can pose problems
for the biological parents, especially if
she sues to establish parental rights.
Indeed, with all alternatives to uterus
transplants, a woman must share her
parenthood with another woman, who
typically will be a stranger to the woman’s family. People care very much who
they include in their families, whether
through marriage or other relationships, and that is no less true for shared
parenting.9 Denying uterus transplants
greatly interferes with women’s ability
to shape their families according to their
own values and preferences.
If the arguments against uterus transplants seem weak, then we should consider whether other factors are at work.
What else might explain the objections
to uterus transplants?
There is good reason to worry that
public policy in the United States gives
short shrift to the interests of infertile
persons. Rather than viewing infertility as a disability and infertile persons
as deserving assistance in their efforts
to procreate, many Americans dismiss
the idea that infertility is disabling.10 In
one study, for example, Elizabeth Britt
found that the infertile often feel as if the
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seriousness of their condition is “trivialized.” Other people might suggest that
infertility is not as bad as other medical
conditions because reproduction “supposedly is so optional,” or they might
even suggest that infertility is a “blessing
in disguise.”11 In Arthur Greil’s study,
infertile persons reported that friends
and family often “act as if . . . infertility
were a small and relatively easy problem
to solve.” Infertile couples did not feel
like they were viewed as inferior because
of their infertility. Rather, the discrimination they felt arose out of a “failure
of others to acknowledge the seriousness
of infertility.”12 Similarly, in academic
commentary or judicial decisions, infertility may be characterized as the loss of
a “lifestyle choice” rather than the loss
of an important capability.13
It is troubling enough that infertility
may not be seen as disabling. In addition, infertility actually may be seen as
enabling. Having children, in this view,
places one at a disadvantage when it
comes to opportunities for a fulfilling
life, whether in the professional world
or with one’s partner. As Germaine
Greer has observed, “Modern society is
unique in that it is profoundly hostile to
children. . . . Mothers who are deeply
involved in exploring and developing
infant intelligence and personality . . .
share the infant’s ostracized status.”14
While not having children may be
a blessing for some people, it is hardly
that for others. Given the fundamental
importance of procreation, the impact
of infertility can be substantial. In one
study, infertility was the most upsetting
experience for 50 percent of women. Indeed, when infertility is a consequence
of cancer or its treatment, some cancer
survivors describe the loss of fertility as
causing as much emotional pain as the
cancer itself.15
There are many important reasons
why women want to bear their own
children. Women may want to have
children with their chosen partner and
without the involvement of third parties. They also may want to benefit from

the ties with their children that develop
during pregnancy. For these and other
reasons, we should not be overly skeptical of uterus transplants.
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